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In Defense of the Obama Administration’s
Non-Defense of DOMA
Introduction

The Constitution charges the President with the duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”1 Moreover, the President
takes an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.”2 Although “[g]enerally, these duties are compatible
. . ., when the Executive faces a law that he believes is unconstitutional, he must decide whether the law should be executed as written and defended if attacked, or whether the duty of faithfulness to
the Constitution requires its repudiation.”3 This decision belongs to
the President alone as the head of a co-equal branch of the federal
government.4 The doctrine of separation of powers dictates, inter alia,
that the President enforces the laws that Congress passes.5 But, a constitutional problem arises “[w]hen the President’s obligation to act in
accord with the Constitution appears to be in tension with his duty to
execute laws enacted by Congress . . . .”6 When advising the President,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) has maintained since at least 18607 that
“the Constitution provides the President with the authority to refuse
to enforce unconstitutional provisions.”8 However, reasonable minds
disagree as to the appropriate standard that should be used by the
President and the DOJ when deciding whether or not to enforce a statU.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
3
See Michael T. Brady, Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 Yale L.J.
970, 972 (1983) (discussing executive discretion over the defense of statutes).
4
See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo.
L.J. 1613, 1632 (2008) (noting that “the President alone must take a constitutional oath” and that
“[t]his duty bars the President from violating the Constitution himself or aiding and abetting the
violations of others . . . .”); see also Carlos A. Ball, When May a President Refuse to Defend a Statute? The
Obama Administration and DOMA, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 77, 81 (2011), available at http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/21/ LRColl2011n21Ball.pdf (“[T]he President, as
the leader of a co-equal branch of government, has an independent duty to interpret and apply the
Constitution.”).
5
See Brady, supra note 3, at 970 (defining “separation of powers”).
6
Memorandum by Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to Counsel to the President on
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 199, 203
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Dellinger Memorandum].
7
See id. at 199 (“Opinions dating to at least 1860 assert the President’s authority to decline to
effectuate enactments that the President views as unconstitutional.”) (citing Memorial of Captain
Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469-70 (1860) (arguing that the President was not obligated to enforce a
statute appointing an officer, where the appointment of officers was peculiarly an Executive Branch
function)).
8
Memorandum by Acting Assistant Attorney General Timothy E. Flanigan to Counsel to the
President on Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16
Op. O.L.C. 18, 31 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Flanigan Memorandum]; see Memorandum by Assistant
Attorney General William P. Barr to Counsel to the President on Issues Raised by Section 102(c)
(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 46 (O.L.C.) (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Barr Memorandum] (“The
Department of Justice has consistently advised that the Constitution provides the President with such
authority.”); contra Memorandum from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to the Secretary of the
Department of Education on the Constitutionality of Congress’ Disapproval of Agency Regulations
by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A Op. O.L.C. 21, 29 (1980).
1
2
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ute.9 Moreover, substantially less has come out of the DOJ regarding
the President’s decision not to defend legislation.10
The purposes of this paper are: (1) to summarize the case law,
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions, and scholarship pertaining
to the doctrines of non-enforcement and non-defense; (2) to propose
workable standards for both non-enforcement and non-defense that
can be used by future Presidents and the DOJ; and, (3) to apply these
standards to President Obama’s recent decision to continue to enforce,
but to not defend, Section 3 of The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)11
in order to show why the decision was proper.
Part I explores the distinction between executive non-enforcement
and executive non-defense. Part I.A discusses the case law (I.A.1), OLC
opinions (I.A.2), and scholarship (I.A.3) addressing non-enforcement,
while Part I.B explores the case law (I.B.1), OLC opinions (I.B.2), and
scholarship (I.B.3) regarding non-defense. Part II briefly surveys the
history of DOMA and the recent decision by the Obama administration
not to defend Section 3 of DOMA. Finally, Part III proposes standards
to be used by future administrations faced with whether to enforce
and defend a statute, and the section ends by applying the standards
to conclude that the Obama administration’s decision to continue to
enforce, but not to defend, Section 3 of DOMA was proper.
I. The Distinction Between Non-Enforcement and Non-Defense
A. Non-Enforcement
There is no uniform standard to guide Presidents in deciding
whether or not to enforce a statute. While only a handful of federal
court cases have addressed the topic,12 opinions from the DOJ’s Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) have expounded on non-enforcement through
various memoranda over the years. Finally, several legal scholars have
analyzed the available case law and executive branch legal opinions in
an attempt to synthesize the various tests. The relevant federal cases,
OLC opinions, and legal scholarship follow.

See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing differing views from three scholars).
Ball, supra note 4, at 77 n.7 (stating that “most of the literature in this area[] addresses the
President’s authority to refuse to enforce (as opposed to the authority to refuse to defend) a federal
statute”).
11
1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997).
12
See, e.g., 1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6, at 199; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952)).
9

10
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1. Case Law

Only one Supreme Court case has addressed the theory of executive non-enforcement: Kendall v. United State ex rel. Stokes.13 However,
because the statements likely were dicta,14 no federal court has had the
opportunity to rule squarely on the question of whether and to what
extent the President may decline to enforce statutes. In addition to
Kendall, there are three Supreme Court and three circuit court cases
that indirectly address the propriety of executive non-enforcement.15
Kendall was an appeal from a circuit court, which issued a writ of
mandamus to compel the Postmaster General to pay out certain funds
owed to mail carriers pursuant to statute.16 In the course of its opinion
affirming issuance of the writ, the Court stated that “[t]o contend that
the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction
of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”17 Although the issue
was not before the Court, Kendall represents the Court’s most pointed
statement about the propriety of non-enforcement.

37 U.S. 524 (1838).
See id. at 609 (stating questions presented limited to “1. Does the record present a proper case
for a mandamus; and if so, then, 2. Had the circuit court of this district jurisdiction of the case, and
authority to issue the writ.”).
15
For the sake of brevity, but in an attempt to be as thorough as possible in detailing the relevant
case law, the pertinent federal district court cases and an on-point dissent from a Seventh Circuit
case will be addressed in this footnote. Some cases support the proposition that the President may,
consistent with the Constitution, decline to enforce statutes he believes are unconstitutional, while
some cases do not. Compare Haring v. Blumenthal, 471 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (D.D.C. 1979) (“The
President must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ and he is not permitted to refrain
from executing laws duly enacted by Congress.”), Da Costa v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (stating bill passed by Congress and signed into law by President “had binding force and
effect on every officer of the Government, no matter what their private judgments of that policy, and
illegalized the pursuit of an inconsistent executive or administration policy” and that “[n]o executive
statement denying efficacy to the legislation could have either validity or effect”), and Catano v. Local
Board, 298 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (“The President is not at liberty to repeal congressional
enactments. . . . That function belongs to Congress alone.”), with Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d
1469, 1492 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, Coffey, & Manion, JJ., dissenting) (“[N]othing about the
constitutional hierarchy implies that only judges have the power to place the Constitution above mere
law. Every governmental official has the duty to do this. The power of judicial review comes from
the hierarchy or rules, with the Constitution superior to law; that same hierarchy applies to every
other governmental actor, and each takes an oath of obedience to the Constitution.”) and United
States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 1993 WL 198842, *2 n.4, *5 (D.D.C. May 26, 1993) (mem. & order)
(finding that Lehman was not applicable and that plaintiffs were not entitled to attorneys’ fees, where
the Department of Justice “presented a colorable claim with at least some support in legal authority”
and made a “good faith attempt to do its job in subtle and difficult areas of law.”). See generally
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative,
21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865, 900-901 & nn. 157-158 (listing federal court cases that have addressed
executive non-enforcement).
16
Kendall, 37 U.S. at 610-12.
17
Id. at 613.
13
14
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The three remaining Supreme Court cases are Myers v. United
States,18 Freytag v. Commissioner,19 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.20 Myers is also the most notable case cited by OLC in support
of non-enforcement.21 In Myers, the Court addressed whether President
Woodrow Wilson had the constitutional authority to remove a postmaster, whom he appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and whom he subsequently removed, notwithstanding an Act
of Congress22 that required the Senate’s advice and consent prior to
such a removal.23 President Andrew Johnson had initially vetoed the
law because he believed it to be an unconstitutional encroachment on
the President’s appointment and removal powers under Article II.24
Fifty years later, the Court agreed with Johnson’s constitutional conclusion and struck down the portion of the statute that restricted the
President’s removal power.25
Myers often is cited for the proposition that the Court implicitly
approved of President Wilson’s defiance of the Tenure in Office Act
and, more exactly, that a President does not act improperly by refusing
to comply with a “constitutionally objectionable statute” that has yet to
come before an Article III court.26 However, it is equally likely that the
case “may suggest only that, if presented with an instance of executive
non-enforcement, the Court will limit its review to the constitutionality
of the statute at issue, and not consider whether the President acted
properly in declining enforcement prior to a judicial ruling.”27
In Freytag, the Court was presented with the question of whether
Congress’s grant of appointment authority to the Chief Judge of the
United States Tax Court violated separation of powers.28 The Court
answered the question in the negative, and Justice Scalia (joined by
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
501 U.S. 868 (1991).
20
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21
See, e.g., 1994 Dellinger Memo, supra note 6, at 199; see also Memorandum from Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senator Max Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Subcomm. on Limitations of
Contracted & Delegated Authority on The Att’y Gen.’s Duty to Defend & Enforce Constitutionally
Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 59 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Civiletti Memorandum] (“In
my view, Myers is very nearly decisive of the issue you have raised.”).
22
Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 80, 81 (“Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes
shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law”)
(emphasis added) (invalidated by Myers, 272 U.S. at 107-108); accord Myers, 272 U.S. at 107-08.
23
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 106-07 (discussing the underlying facts of the case and citing the relevant
statute).
24
See id. at 166 (citing Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 340 (1897)).
25
See id. at 176 (“[T]he Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President
from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.”).
26
Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 7, 25 (2000).
27
Id.
28
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991).
18
19
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Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.29 About the constitutionally enshrined doctrine
of separation of powers, Justice Scalia noted that
it was not enough simply to repose the power to execute
the laws (or to appoint) in the President; it was also necessary to provide him with the means to resist legislative encroachment upon that power. The means selected
were various, including a separate political constituency, to which he alone was responsible, and the power
to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them
when they are unconstitutional.30
Finally, in Youngstown Sheet, the Court was “asked to decide
whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when
he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills.”31 In his famous
concurring opinion, Justice Jackson identified specific instances where
the President can justifiably act contrary to an Act of Congress.32 The
third category delineating presidential power—when the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress33— is most germane to the debate surrounding non-enforcement. In his rationale for this presidential power, Justice Jackson cited
to Myers to show that Congress implicitly sanctioned rare instances of
this category in the past.34
The other cases dealing with this issue are all from circuit courts of
appeals, and shed light on the judiciary’s views of a President’s power
to ignore statutes. Professor Christopher May, discussed infra Part
I.A.3, buttresses his case35 against non-enforcement primarily with the

Id. at 892 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 906 (citing Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 920-24
(1990)) (emphasis added).
31
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
32
Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (listing the following instances: when the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress; when the President acts in absence
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority; and when the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress).
33
Id. at 637-38.
34
See id. at 638 (“However, his exclusive power of removal in executive agencies, affirmed in Myers v.
United States . . . continued to be asserted and maintained.”).
35
Professor May contends that “[n]o lower federal courts have held that a President may ignore laws
he thinks are unconstitutional.” May, supra note 15, at 901 n.158. More astonishingly, May’s assertion
that “[m]ost federal judges who have addressed the issue have agreed that the Executive is obligated
to enforce” congressional statutes is flatly contradicted by the case law he himself includes in the
footnote used as support for the proposition. See id. (listing two cases that support his proposition, but
then including two cases that reject his position).
29
30
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman,36 notwithstanding
the case’s subsequent procedural history that includes, importantly,
the en banc court’s withdrawal of the portion of the panel’s opinion
upon which Professor May relies.37 Specifically, the panel addressed
“the Executive Branch’s constitutional challenge to legislation regulating procedures for the award of procurement contracts by federal
agencies.”38 The Navy argued that the Competition in Contracting Act
of 198439 was unconstitutional because it permitted the Comptroller
General to decide the duration of suspensions or stays of government
awards in the event a contract is protested, therefore granting to an officer of the legislative branch powers reserved only for executive branch
officials.40 The panel had the following information before it:
In a subsequent hearing before the House Judiciary
Committee on April 18, 1985, Attorney General Edwin
Meese expanded on this position by stating that the
President has the duty to put his own interpretation of
the Constitution ahead of any statute and obey it rather
than the statute itself, and that, furthermore, the executive branch might not honor the CICA stay provisions
until those were upheld by the Supreme Court.41
Before the court, the government reasserted the position it took
before Congress, i.e., “that the President’s suspension of the [Act’s] stay
provisions is justified, because the President’s duty to uphold the constitution and faithfully execute the laws empowers the President to interpret the Constitution and disregard laws he deems unconstitutional.”42
The panel disagreed with this interpretation, calling it “utterly at odds
with the texture and plain language of the Constitution” and admonishing the government attorneys for “offer[ing] scant and extremely
questionable support for [such a] dubious assertion of power.”43 The
panel confronted the government’s assertion head-on and stated that
“[t]he ‘line item veto’ does not exist in the federal Constitution, and
the executive branch cannot bring a de facto ‘line item veto’ into existence by promulgating orders to suspend parts of statutes which the
842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) (Lehman I), withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh’g, 893 F.2d 205 (9th
Cir. 1989) (as amended, Jan. 10, 1990) (en banc) (per curiam).
37
See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1989) (Lehman II) (as amended, Jan. 10,
1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (“Accordingly, Part III of the decision published in [Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Lehman] is withdrawn from publication, and the judgment of the district court awarding attorney fees
to Lear Siegler is reversed.”).
38
Lehman I, 842 F.2d at 1104.
39
Competition in Contracting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1984).
40
Lehman I, 842 F.2d at 1104.
41
Id. at 1121.
42
Id.
43
Id.
36
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President has signed into law.”44 Thus, it is clear on what side of the
argument the Ninth Circuit panel fell.45
In Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,46 the court (in
dicta)47 addressed the same statute48 that was at issue in Lehman I.49 The
Ameron court acknowledged that the debate surrounded the President’s
assertion that “in the case of a conflict between the Constitution and a
statute, the President’s duty faithfully to execute the law requires him
not to observe a statute that is in conflict with the Constitution . . . .”50
Reacting to this assertion of such power, the court characterized
“[t]his claim of right for the President to declare statutes unconstitutional and to declare his refusal to execute them, as distinguished from
his undisputed right to veto, criticize, or even refuse to defend in court,
statutes which he regards as unconstitutional [as] dubious at best.”51
Finally, in United States v. Smith,52 an early opinion by Justice
Paterson (sitting as Circuit Justice), the court expounded in detail on
the purported power of the President to refuse to enforce statutes:
When it has become a law, . . . it is his duty to take care
that it be faithfully executed. He cannot suspend its
operation, dispense with its application, or prevent its
effect . . . . If he could do so, he could repeal the law,
and would thus invade the province assigned to the
legislature . . . .53
The court then answered the question of what remedies are available in the event that a President chooses not to enforce a particular
law: (1) “his conduct may be the subject of inquiry before another

Id. at 1124.
However, to the extent that an en banc court withdrew Part III of that opinion, this excerpt
represents, at best, a useful piece of dictum for scholars on either side of the debate. See Lear Siegler,
Inc v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (withdrawing the previous panel decision in part).
46
787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986), aff’d on reh’g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986).
47
See id. at 889 (“The question of the President’s actions, declarations, and purported refusal to order
compliance with CICA, however, was not properly before the district court. . . . We are faced with no
justiciable claim against the President stemming from an alleged usurpation of power.”).
48
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1984).
49
See May, supra note 15, at 901 n.158 (citing the language in Ameron discussing the President’s right
to declare statutes unconstitutional and declaring it dicta).
50
See Ameron, 787 F.2d at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Constitutionality of GAO’s
Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the H. Comm. on
Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1985) (testimony of Acting Deputy Attorney General
D. Lowell Jensen)); see also Edwin Meese III, President’s Right to Challenge Law, N.Y. Times, May 21,
1985 (Letter to the Editor).
51
See Ameron, 787 F.2d at 889 (expressing disagreement with the asserted claim of right for the
President to declare statutes unconstitutional and refuse to execute them).
52
27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
53
Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1203.
44
45
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tribunal” or (2) “[i]f he has been guilty of crimes or misdemeanors,
he is answerable upon an impeachment.”54
The gist of these seven cases—Kendall, Myers, Freytag, Youngstown
Sheet, Lehman, Ameron, and Smith—is that the case law is conflicting.
Kendall, even if its relevant portions are dicta, certainly weighs heavily
in favor of those who argue that executive non-enforcement is simply
not a constitutionally cognizable doctrine. However, Myers appears to
cut in favor of non-enforcement. To be sure, Myers does not address the
matter straight forwardly, but the Court easily could have commented
on President Wilson’s defiant actions that directly contravened the statute at issue. That they did not may, as Professor Johnsen contends,55
simply means that the Court was unwilling to address the issue at
all. On the other hand, Myers could just as easily stand for the Court’s
implicit approval of President Wilson’s actions.56 Moreover, Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Freytag and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngtown Sheet further suggest that some Justices in the past have
assumed, if not implied, a presidential power of non-enforcement in
limited instances. Finally, the three circuit court cases, Lehman, Ameron,
and Smith, oppose any constitutional construction that grants the
President the power not to enforce certain legislation. Thus, the available case law provides useful arguments for those on both sides of the
argument.
2. OLC Opinions
The position of the President, as articulated through Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) opinions, can be synthesized from four memoranda
written between 1980 and 1994: the 1980 Civiletti Memorandum,57
1990 Barr Memorandum,58 1992 Flanigan Memorandum,59 and 1994
Dellinger Memorandum.60 These memoranda have cited to one or more
of the above-listed cases in support of executive non-enforcement.
a. Civiletti Memorandum
In 1980, Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti responded
to eleven questions posed to him by Senator Max Baucus61 regarding

Id. at 1204.
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 25.
56
See generally, e.g., 1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6, at 199.
57
1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21.
58
1990 Barr Memorandum, supra note 8.
59
1992 Flanigan Memorandum, supra note 8.
60
1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6.
61
Senator Baucus was Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Limitations of Contracted and
Delegated Authority.
54
55
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the precedent, if any, of the DOJ’s failure to enforce an Act of Congress.
Civiletti had this to say:
I do not believe that the prerogative of the Executive is
to exercise free and independent judgment on constitutional questions presented by Acts of Congress. At the
same time, I think that in rare cases the Executive’s duty
to the constitutional system may require that a statute
be challenged; and if that happens, executive action in
defiance of the statute is authorized and lawful if the
statute is unconstitutional.62
In support of this proposition, Civiletti cited Myers v. United States
and stated that Myers held “that the President’s constitutional duty
does not require him to execute unconstitutional statutes; nor does it
require him to execute them provisionally, against the day that they are
declared unconstitutional by the courts.”63 However, Civiletti quickly
qualified his interpretation of Myers by reiterating that, in the rare
cases where a President is justified in declining to enforce a statute, it
is not the President but rather “the Constitution that dispenses with
the operation of the statute.”64 Civiletti agreed “that the Executive
can rarely defy an Act of Congress without upsetting the equilibrium
established within our constitutional system,” but he also stated that
“if that equilibrium has already been placed in jeopardy by the Act of
Congress itself, the case is much more likely to fall within that narrow
class.”65 Civiletti described this “narrow class” of laws as ones that, by
their very existence, shift the delicate balance of power enshrined in the
Constitution. Civiletti noted that
[f]rom time to time Congress has attempted to limit the
President’s power to remove, and thereby control, the
officers of the United States. Some of these attempts
have been consistent with the Constitution; others have
not. In every one of these instances, however, it was the
Act of Congress itself that altered the balance of forces
between the Executive and Legislative Branches; and
if the Executive had invariably honored the Act, our
constitutional system would have been changed by fait
accompli.66

62
63
64
65
66

1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21, at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.
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Finally, in response to Senator Baucus’s query regarding past opinions of the Attorney General on which Civiletti relied, Civiletti cited to
a 1942 opinion of Attorney General Francis Biddle67 and the opinions to
which Biddle cited therein.68 From these opinions, Civiletti determined
that “[n]one of them concludes that the Executive must enforce and
defend every Act of Congress in every conceivable case . . . .”69
Thus, under Civiletti’s views, the President is authorized to not
enforce an Act of Congress only in two instances: when a statute is (1)
transparently invalid70 or (2) infringes on presidential power.71
b. Barr Memorandum
A decade after Civiletti drafted his memorandum, Assistant Attorney
General William P. Barr responded to a request from the Counsel to
the President for an opinion regarding whether President Bush could
refuse to enforce 102(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Bill for
fiscal years 1990 and 1991.72 Barr answered in the affirmative and concluded that, because under the Take Care Clause an unconstitutional
statute is not a law at all,73 the President is not compelled to enforce
it.74 Moreover, Barr rejected “the argument that the President may not
treat a law as invalid prior to a judicial determination but rather must
presume it to be constitutional.”75 He continued and also stated that
OLC consistently has rejected the argument “that the veto power is
the only tool available to the President to oppose an unconstitutional
law.”76 Moreover, Barr made clear that in addition to the Take Care
Clause, “the oath to defend the Constitution allows the President to
refuse to execute a law he believes is contrary to the supreme law, the
Constitution.”77 “[P]residential decisions not to enforce a statute which
Memorandum from Attorney General Francis Biddle to President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Political
Activity by State or Local Employees, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 158 (1942).
68
See 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21, at 60 (emphasizing the superseding obligation to
Acts of Congress while holding that the President is not required to enforce the Acts of Congress in
every conceivable case within the parameters of the Constitution).
69
Id.
70
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 23. For the first prong of this test, see 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra
note 21, at 63 n.1 (“If an Act of Congress directs or authorizes the Executive to take action which
is ‘transparently invalid’ when viewed in light of established constitutional law, I believe it is the
Executive’s constitutional duty to decline to execute that power.”).
71
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 23. For the second prong of this test, see 1980 Civiletti Memorandum,
supra note 21, at 56 (“If that equilibrium [of the balance of separation of powers] has already been
placed in jeopardy by the Act of Congress itself, the case is much more likely to fall within that
narrow class.”).
72
1990 Barr Memorandum, supra note 8, at 46.
73
See The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No legislative
act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”).
74
Barr Memorandum, supra note 8, at 47.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 48.
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violates the separation of powers have been justified by the need to
resist legislative encroachment.”78 Furthermore, Barr cited Chief Justice
Chase and emphasized “that the President’s obligation to defend the
Constitution of the United States authorizes him to decline to enforce
statutes which he believes are unconstitutional.”79 Additionally, Barr
cited to James Wilson, a drafter of the Constitution and vocal advocate on its behalf, who stated during the Convention debates that “the
President of the United States could shield himself and refuse to carry
into effect an act that violates the Constitution.”80 Barr also referenced
several past OLC opinions that supported the modern DOJ’s views
on non-enforcement.81 Finally, in the last pages of the memorandum,
Barr raises and then rejects the arguments that (1) the Take Care Clause
precludes a President’s decision not to enforce a statute, and (2) the
President must always enforce a law he believes to be unconstitutional
until a federal court declares the law to be unconstitutional.82
Thus, Barr more fully explores the case law and historical evidence
that support non-enforcement, while he succinctly yet completely
raises and then dismisses the two primary criticisms against nonenforcement. Although he did not provide a test to use to decide when
a President may properly refuse to enforce a statute, Barr, like Civilleti,
emphasized the narrowness of the doctrine and confined it only to such
“legislation that infringes the separation of powers . . . .”83
c. Flanigan Memorandum
In 1992, Acting Assistant Attorney General Timothy E. Flanigan
responded to a request for an opinion on the constitutionality of two
laws84 that purported to limit the number of passports the President
Id. at 49.
Id. at 48; see Letter from Chief Justice Chase to Gerrit Smith (Apr. 19, 1868), in The Life & Public
Services of Salmon Portland Chase 577, 578 (D. Appleton & Co., 1874) (“How can the President
fulfill his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, if he has no right to defend it against
an act of Congress sincerely believed by him to have been passed in violation of it?”).
80
Barr Memorandum, supra note 8, at 48 (citing 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of
the Constitution 450 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson on Dec. 1, 1787)).
81
See id. at 49 (citing, inter alia, Letter from William French Smith, Att’y Gen., to Congressman Peter
W. Rodino, Jr., at 3 (Feb. 22, 1985) and Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Att’y Gen., to Congressman
Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., (Jan. 13, 1981)); see also id. at 50 (citing Recommendation That the Dep’t of
Justice Not Defend the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Bankr. Amendments & Fed.
Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 183, 195 (1984) (“[T]he President need not blindly
execute or defend laws enacted by Congress if such laws trench on his constitutional power and
responsibility.”)).
82
Barr Memorandum, supra note 8, at 50-51.
83
Id. at 50.
84
The first law at issue was Section 129(e) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 647 (1991). The second law at issue was Section 503 of the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Acts, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-140, 105 Stat. 782 (1991).
78
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could issue to United States government personnel.85 Flanigan began
by reiterating OLC’s past opinions and emphasizing that “[a]mong
the laws that the President must ‘take Care’ to faithfully execute is the
Constitution.”86 Flanigan acknowledged that conflicts sometimes arise
between a statute and the Constitution.87 Most of Flanigan’s analysis
simply restated the arguments advanced by the Civiletti and Barr
Memoranda; however, because Freytag had just recently been decided,
Flanigan added Justice Scalia’s concurrence to the body of available
case law.88 Moreover, unlike the Civiletti and Barr Memos, the Flanigan
Memo directly addressed the jurisprudential elephant in the room,
Marbury v. Madison.89 For the President to continue to enforce a law he
believed was unconstitutional until such time as a federal court could
rule on the law’s constitutionality “would subtly transform the proposition established in Marbury v. Madison—in deciding a case or controversy, the Judiciary must decide whether a statute is constitutional—to
the fundamentally different proposition that a statute conflicts with the
Constitution only when the courts declare so.”90
Thus, the Flanigan Memorandum differs from both the Civiletti
and Barr Memoranda in two important respects. First, it incorporates
Freytag, which sheds light on the then-current views of Justices Scalia,
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Second, the Flanigan Memorandum
more directly challenges the understanding of the traditional rule from
Marbury, i.e., that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”91 It is the second distinction that makes the Flanigan Memorandum sweep more broadly than
either the Civiletti or Barr Memorandum.92

1992 Flanigan Memorandum, supra note 8, at 18.
Id. at 31.
87
Id. at 31-32.
88
Id. at 33. Flanigan noted that the Freytag majority did not disagree with Justice Scalia’s conclusion
that “‘the means [available to a President] to resist legislative encroachment’ upon his power included
‘the power to veto encroaching laws, or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional.’” Id.
(quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 906) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see
also id. (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the latest in a long line of authority dating back to the framing of
the Constitution.”).
89
Professors Eugene Gressman and Arthur Miller both criticized the doctrine of non-enforcement on
multiple grounds, including that the doctrine was utterly at odds with the rule laid out in Marbury.
See Flanigan Memorandum, supra note 8, at 35-36 (citing Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful
Execution of the Laws, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 389 (1987) and Constitutionality of GAO’s Bid Protest Function:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House of Representatives Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 74 (1985) (statement of Professor Gressman)).
90
1992 Flanigan Memorandum, supra note 8, at 36 (emphasis in original).
91
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
92
See Johnsen, supra note 26, at 16 (characterizing the Flanigan Memo as “describ[ing] presidential
non-enforcement authority in sweeping terms”).
85
86
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d. Dellinger Memorandum

Similar to Attorney General Civiletti’s confinement of non-enforcement to a narrow category of cases, Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger likewise took a context-dependent approach.93 Dellinger
began his opinion by noting the “significant judicial approval” of nonenforcement,94 and he continued by reiterating that the “consistent
and substantial executive practice” also supports non-enforcement in
certain situations.95 Dellinger steadfastly defended the “unassailable”
position that “in some situations the President may decline to enforce
unconstitutional statutes . . . .”96 Dellinger further explained the appropriateness of the doctrine by concluding that because “[s]ome legislative encroachments on executive authority . . . will not be justiciable or
are for other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court[,] . . . the President
cannot look to a judicial determination, [and instead] must shoulder the
responsibility of protecting the constitutional role of the presidency.”97
The 1994 Dellinger Memorandum makes clear that the President has
the authority to sign legislation containing desirable elements while
refusing to execute a constitutionally defective provision.98
However, unlike his predecessors, Dellinger expounded on seven
considerations upon which a President should rely when faced with the
difficult decision of whether or not to enforce a statute.99 These seven
considerations form the broader structural framework from which
the following three-part, multi-factor test is derived: (1) The President
has an independent duty to protect and defend the Constitution,
which includes the duty promptly to communicate his constitutional
objections to a statute to Congress; and while he should presume the
constitutionality of laws passed by Congress, he must still exercise
his independent judgment in determining (a) if a statute is unconstitutional and (b) whether it is probable that the Court would agree with
him.100 (2) If he answers (1)(a) and (1)(b) in the affirmative, then he must
next balance the effect of compliance on the rights of individuals and
on his own presidential authority, giving special weight to whether the
law purports to limit the President’s Article II powers (especially his

I have adopted Professor Johnsen’s conclusion that both Civiletti and Dellinger use a “contextdependent approach” to non-enforcement. See id. at 25.
94
1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6, at 199 (citing to Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926), Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
95
Id. (noting that “second, consistent and substantial practice confirms this general position.”).
96
Id. at 200.
97
Id. at 201.
98
See id. at 200.
99
Id. at 200-03.
100
See 1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6, at 200.
93
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Commander in Chief powers).101 Finally, (3) the fact that the President
signed the very law he then declines to enforce does not change the
analysis.102
3. Three Views from Three Scholars
Over the past twenty-five years, a small yet comprehensive body
of scholarly literature on executive non-enforcement has emerged and
continues to divide academics.103 Three scholars representing three different viewpoints are outlined in this section.
a. Professor Christopher N. May:
Mandatory Enforcement Except In The Narrowest
Of Circumstances
Professor Christopher May believes that executive non-enforcement
hearkens back to the English royal prerogative and is therefore anathema to the fundamental principles held by the Framers and enshrined in
the Constitution.104 According to Professor May, a President’s decision
to not enforce a statute is tantamount to his suspension of all or part of
a duly enacted statute. Professor May argues that such an action by the
President is indistinguishable from the royal prerogative of suspension
of a law passed by Parliament.105 It can be extrapolated from this conclusion that the President must enforce all congressional statutes even
if he believes the statute violates the Constitution.106 May supports his
theory by harkening back to the intention of the Framers in creating a
presidential veto power, as set forth in the Federalist Papers,107 for the
President to defend his department from promulgating unconstituSee id. at 200-01.
See id. at 202.
103
See generally Prakash, supra note 4; Johnsen, supra note 26 (arguing for case-by-case approach);
J. Randy Beck, Book Review, 16 Const. Comment. 419 (1999) (reviewing Christopher N. May,
Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative (1998))
(disagreeing with Professor May’s categorization of executive non-enforcement as an extension of the
British Crown’s “royal prerogative”); May, supra note 15 (opposing the practice of presidential nonexecution and likening the practice to a resurgence of the discretionary power of dispensation enjoyed
by English monarchs at the time of the Constitution’s ratification); see also Prakash, supra note 4, at
1617 n.20 (citing scholarship).
104
See generally May, supra note 15 (espousing the belief that the Framers of the Constitution did not
envision the President would have the power to suspend laws).
105
See id. at 869 (“Presidential nonenforcement of ‘unconstitutional’ laws is equivalent to giving the
Chief Executive a suspending power, one of the royal prerogatives exercised by the kings of England,
which was wrested from the crown less than a century before the American Revolution.”); see also id.
at 893 (“The argument that a President may refuse to enforce laws he believes to be unconstitutional
is but a reincarnation of the claimed royal prerogative of suspending the laws which was abolished in
England by the Bill of Rights of 1689.”).
106
Id. at 878.
107
The Federalist No. 73, at 443, 445 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., New American
Library 1961).
101
102
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tional laws.108 In instances where a law was passed during a previous
administration, the President can ask Congress to repeal the law or, if
that fails, he can refuse to defend the measure in the courts.109
However, May’s rule does contain a narrow exception whereby the
President may, consistent with the Constitution, refuse to enforce all
or part of a statute.110 He contends that the Framers envisioned judicial
review of legislature as a check on the legislative process and, therefore, “[i]t would . . . not be incompatible with the original scheme for
a President to ignore a clearly unconstitutional law if there is no other
way for judicial review to occur.”111
If placed on a spectrum, Professor May’s views would be on one
extreme end representing the view that non-enforcement is almost
always unconstitutional.112
b. Professor Dawn E. Johnsen: A Context-Dependent
Approach to Non-Enforcement
Professor Johnsen laments that although “[t]he existing literature
is extensive and impressive[,] [m]ost commentators . . . find greater
constitutional clarity than [she] believe[s] exists . . . .”113 In Johnsen’s
view, “the Constitution’s text, history, and structure neither preclude
nor authorize all presidential refusals to enforce constitutionally
objectionable laws.”114 Johnsen favors a middle-of-the-road approach
that acknowledges that the President must sometimes make “difficult evaluations that depend on the specific statutory provision and

Id. at 881.
Id. at 969.
110
Id. at 988 (explaining that the President may act in this way only if four principles are satisfied).
The four principles that must be satisfied are: 1) the unconstitutionality of the law is clearly indicated
from the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, or prior rulings of the Supreme Court; 2)
the President has exhausted all avenues for redressing the problem through the legislative process; 3)
defiance of the law is the only way to bring the question of its constitutionality before the courts; and
4) the Executive must take all steps possible to ensure that judicial review actually occurs.
111
Id. at 987.
112
See id. at 867 (characterizing executive non-enforcement as “an alarming development . . . [that]
threatens to further enhance the power of what already has many of the trappings of an Imperial
Presidency”); see generally Beck, supra note 103, at 420-24 (challenging May’s conclusions and stating
that “May’s argument loses steam . . . when applied to a President’s good faith refusal to implement a
statute on constitutional grounds.”).
113
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 10.
114
Id. Presidential non-enforcement does not directly or invariably conflict with Congress’s
ability to pass legislation or the judiciary’s responsibility to “say what the law is” in the context
of resolving justiciable controversies. The President, for example, promotes implementation of
the Supreme Court’s pronouncements by declining to enforce laws that are indistinguishable
from those the Court has held unconstitutional; and at least where Congress passed the laws
prior to the Court’s articulation of the constitutional rule and without consideration of the
constitutional issue, non-enforcement does not inappropriately interfere with Congress’s
lawmaking power.
108
109
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the circumstances surrounding its enactment.”115 Johnsen rejects the
argument that non-enforcement deprives the judiciary of its Article III
powers to adjudicate appropriate cases.116 But she is resolute in defending the proposition that a decision on the merits of a constitutional
question by an Article III court ultimately trumps the President’s own
constitutional conclusion.117 Moreover, Johnsen also views the Take
Care Clause not as affirmatively requiring non-enforcement, as was the
position taken in the Civiletti OLC memoranda,118 but instead as a limit
on non-enforcement.119
Johnsen separates the existing scholarship into two camps: mandatory enforcement and routine non-enforcement.120 She places Professor
May121 and the Ninth Circuit’s Lehman case in the first category and the
1992 Flanigan Memorandum in the second category.122 Johnsen views
those who subscribe to mandatory enforcement123 as glossing over
crucial historical and jurisprudential facts.124 For example, for over 200
years the President and his legal advisers, as evidenced through countless opinions by Attorneys General and other appointees within the
DOJ, have proven “that the President, too, is capable of principled constitutional interpretation.”125 President Thomas Jefferson was the first
President to refuse to enforce a law (the Sedition Act) that he viewed as

115

Id.
See id. at 15 (“Article III does not confer on the federal courts exclusive authority to interpret the
Constitution, and the President does not usurp judicial power by acting on his constitutional views
in the course of exercising executive authority.”).
117
See id. at 18 (equating judicial review of the President’s constitutional conclusions with judicial
review of Congress’s constitutional conclusions, as was the issue in Marbury). Professor Johnsen
rejects the views of Professor Michael Paulsen, who argues in the extreme that not only does the
President have a duty not to enforce unconstitutional statutes, but he also must decline to enforce the
judgment of an Article III court to the extent that the President’s constitutional views conflict with the
court’s views. See id. (citing Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 340 (1994)).
118
See supra Part II.A.
119
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 16.
120
Id. at 10.
121
Professor Johnsen also includes in this category Professor Edward S. Corwin, whom I recognize
is an authority in this area but on whom I have chosen not to expound for brevity’s sake. For a
comprehensive view of Professor Corwin’s work, see generally Edward S. Corwin, The President:
Office and Powers (4th rev. ed. 1957).
122
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 15-17. Also included in this second category is Judge Frank Easterbrook
of the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 17-18. Moreover, if Professor Prakash’s article had been available
at the time, Professor Johnsen undoubtedly would have included Prakash in the category of those
supporting routine non-enforcement.
123
See discussion infra Part I.A.3.a.
124
See Johnsen, supra note 26, at 40-41 (indicating that Presidents have been able to engage in
“principled constitutional interpretation” for two centuries).
125
Id. at 40.
116
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unconstitutional.126 In addition to this historical support, Johnsen offers
the more convincing argument that “[j]udicial doctrines of deference
and justiciability often diminish the effectiveness of the courts in blocking unconstitutional laws . . . .”127 Johnsen views these boundaries to
Article III review as “reflecting, in part, the institutional limitations of
the judiciary as well as the respect for the constitutional roles of the
political branches.”128
Adopting the context-dependent approach typified in the 1994
Dellinger Memorandum, Johnsen proposes six questions that
Presidents should ask themselves in deciding whether or not to enforce
a particular statute.129 Johnsen’s multi-factor approach adopts much of
the same context-specific inquiries that distinguish the 1994 Dellinger
Memorandum and, to a lesser degree, the 1980 Civiletti Memorandum.
c. Professor Sai Prakash: Routine Non-Enforcement
Professor Prakash falls on the other extreme of the debate by advocating for routine non-enforcement supported by a constitutional duty
to act.130 More exactly, Prakash argues “that the Constitution’s text and
structure actually enshrine a duty to disregard federal statutes that
violate the Constitution. That is to say, the President must take care
not to faithfully execute unconstitutional laws.”131 The crux of Prakash’s
theory is that an unconstitutional law is void ab initio and is, there-

See Memorandum to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
311 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897) (“But the Executive, believing the law to be
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided to him
by the Constitution.”); accord Johnsen, supra note 26, at 20 (citing same).
127
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 41.
128
Id. at 42.
129
Id. at 53.
1. How clear is the law’s constitutional defect?
2. Does the President possess institutional expertise relevant to resolving the constitutional
issue, and what are the relative interpretive abilities of the three branches?
3. Did Congress actually consider the constitutional issue in enacting the law?
4. What is the likelihood of judicial review and how would non-enforcement affect that
likelihood?
5. How serious is the harm that would result from enforcement?
6. Is repeal of the statute or non-defense of the statute against legal challenge an effective
alternative to non-enforcement? As a preliminary matter, the President also should explore
any available alternatives that would avoid the constitutional problem, including urging
Congress to correct the problem before passage, adopting a saving construction of the
provision, and considering the possibility of a veto.
130
Professor Prakash distinguishes his approach from the approach taken by scholars who have
adopted a multi-factor test, e.g., Professor Johnsen. See Prakash, supra note 4, at 1626-27 (arguing
that the multi-factor test is insufficient because “it conceives of Executive Disregard as a discretionary
power to be wielded judiciously”) (emphasis added).
131
Id. at 1629.
126
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fore, not a law at all.132 If, then, the statute is not a law, the Take Care
Clause is not implicated.133 Furthermore, “[i]f the President enforced
unconstitutional statutes, he would be a participant in a constitutional
violation,”134 thereby violating his oath to uphold the Constitution.135
Prakash’s primary intellectual qualm with those who advocate for discretionary non-enforcement is “that nothing in the Constitution seems
to grant a discretionary disregard power.”136 In other words, Prakash
reads the presidential oath as imposing upon the President—and him
alone—the grave duty to uphold the Constitution, a duty that “bars the
President from violating the Constitution himself or aiding and abetting the violations of others . . . .”137
Obviously, such an expansive view of executive non-enforcement
raises legitimate concerns about the limits of such power. Yet, Prakash
answers these concerns by reassuring the skeptic that the President, in
addition to facing political pressure from the people138 in the event his
constitutional conclusion is erroneous, also may face impeachment.139
And if neither of those remedies proves readily available, “[t]he courts
stand ready to hear cases accusing the President of disobeying a valid
law (assuming, of course, that someone has standing).”140
Although some of his arguments merit consideration, Prakash’s
proposed test to be employed by future Presidents leaves much to be
desired:
When Presidents are unable to reach their own constitutional conclusions, however, they should disregard congressional statutes only when they conclude that there
are reasons to believe that they would agree with others
who have advised them that a statute is unconstitutional.
More precisely, the President must have good reason
to conclude that advice to disregard a statute is sound
either because the President preliminarily reached the
See id. at 1616 (“Far from vesting him with a discretionary Executive Disregard power, the
Constitution actually requires the President to disregard unconstitutional statutes. This duty arises
from three sources. First, the Constitution does not authorize the President to enforce unconstitutional
laws. At the founding, such laws were seen as null and void, ab initio.”) (second emphasis added).
133
See id. (“Because unconstitutional laws were nullities, they supplied no law for the President to
enforce.”).
134
Id. at 1629.
135
Id. (arguing that this demonstrates that the Constitution’s text “enshrines” a duty to disregard
federal statutes that the President believes violates the Constitution).
136
Id. at 1630.
137
Id. at 1632.
138
See id. at 1638 (“[A]lthough the Constitution requires the Executive to defend the Constitution
against unconstitutional laws, it also assumes that the people and Congress will hold him accountable
for his decisions to disregard statutes he believes are unconstitutional.”).
139
Id. at 1639 (admitting, however, that the President is likely to face impeachment only “[i]n
particularly egregious cases”).
140
Id. (emphasis added).
132
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same conclusion or because, on a range of other legal
questions, the President regards the interpreter as
closely mirroring his own constitutional views.141

What constitutes “reasons to believe,” “good reason,” or “a range of
other legal questions” is unclear. Instead, Prakash’s rather muddled and
ambiguous standard only further underscores the inherent difficulties
in proposing such an expansive view of executive non-enforcement.
B. Non-Defense
“[W]hen the Executive faces a law that he believes is unconstitutional, he must decide whether the law should be executed as written
and defended if attacked . . . .”142 A President may decline to defend laws
that unconstitutionally infringe on his Article II powers or laws that
are “clearly” or “patently” unconstitutional.143 As long as a reasonable
argument can be made in support of a law, the executive will continue
to defend it.144 However, not all plausible arguments are “reasonable”
arguments.145 Key to the DOJ’s decision not to defend a particular law is
where “‘it is manifest that the President has concluded that the statute
is unconstitutional.’”146 Aside from these general and informal guidelines, “[t]here exist no formal guidelines that the Attorney General, the
Solicitor General[,] and other Department [of Justice] officials consult
in making such decisions [not to defend].”147 Although the executive
branch once narrowly construed “clearly unconstitutional” when
evaluating whether to defend a statute, the post-1980 construction has
assumed a broader construction.148 Similar to the doctrine of executive
non-enforcement, the doctrine of executive non-defense appears in
case law, OLC memoranda, and scholarship. However, each category
is far less rich than in the area of non-enforcement.

Id. at 1679-80.
See Brady, supra note 3, at 972 (discussing former and current views of executive discretion over
defense of statutes).
143
Chrysanthe Gussis, Note, The Constitution, the White House, and the Military HIV Ban: A New Threshold
for Presidential Non-Defense of Statutes, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 591, 606 (1997).
144
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to the Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter to Speaker], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
145
Id. at 5.
146
Id. (quoting Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1083 (2001)).
147
Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, at 7 (Mar. 22,
1996), available at http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/DOJ1996.pdf [hereinafter Fois
Letter].
148
See Brady, supra note 3, at 974-75 (“[A]s a practical matter, the executive branch has construed
the authority to decline to defend [“clearly unconstitutional”] statutes . . . quite narrowly and, until
recently, had exercised its discretion only once, in 1963, to challenge a separate-but-equal hospital
financing provision of federal law.”).
141
142
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1. Case Law
Initially, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has implicitly
approved of executive non-defense in cases where executive power
is implicated.149 For purposes of this paper, however, the scope of the
doctrine of non-defense is limited only to those cases in which the
executive enforced, but declined to defend, legislation implicating
individual rights.150
Prior to 1977, “the executive branch enforced, but did not defend,
legislation infringing on individual constitutional rights in only two
[cases]”:151 United States v. Lovett152 and Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital.153 In Lovett, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision of an appropriations bill that classified certain federal employees as dangerous and unfit for continued service.154 President Roosevelt
objected to the provision but signed the bill nonetheless in order to
appropriate the necessary wartime funds.155 However, Roosevelt refused
to defend the law before the Supreme Court, so Congress authorized
an amicus curiae to defend it.156 Nothing in the Lovett Court’s opinion
suggests that President Roosevelt acted improperly in deciding not to
defend the provision before the Court.157 President Roosevelt’s decision
not to defend the law at issue in Lovett “implies that non-defense may
be appropriate where the constitutionality of a statute is not a matter of
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae in support of appellees.”).
Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning
the adjudication of this case in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of
§ 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and
accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a
defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is
inapplicable or unconstitutional.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983).
150
This narrow scope is appropriate for the subsequent discussion of the decision not to defend
DOMA, which does not threaten the President’s executive power. Furthermore, there is little guidance
from the Supreme Court on the topic. See Gussis, supra note 143, at 607 (“Yet, in cases involving
individual constitutional rights, Supreme Court guidance is often limited.”).
151
Id.
152
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
153
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
154
See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315-18 (holding the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, ch. 218, § 304, 57
Stat. 431, 450 (1943), unconstitutional, because it was a bill of attainder that punished three named
individuals by depriving them of pay, without a judicial trial).
155
Id. at 305 n.1 (noting that that President Roosevelt felt “that § 304 of the bill was unconstitutional”).
156
See id. at 306 (“The Solicitor General, appearing for the Government, joined in the first two of
respondents’ contentions but took no position on the third. House Resolution 386, 89 Cong. Rec.
10882, and Public Law 249, 78th Congress, 58 Stat. 113, authorized a special counsel to appear on
behalf of the Congress.”).
157
See id. at 305 n.1 (“As we shall point out, the President signed the bill because he had to do so since
the appropriated funds were imperatively needed to carry on the war. He felt, however, that section 304
of the bill was unconstitutional, and failed to reappoint respondents.”); see Gussis, supra note 143, at 607.
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clear, settled law.”158 Thus, Lovett seems to “promote[] a lower threshold
for presidential non-defense of statutes.”159
In Simkins, the Fourth Circuit (sitting en banc) was faced with a law
modeled after a law previously struck down by the Supreme Court.160
The United States moved to intervene and, “unusually enough, . . .
joined the plaintiffs in [an] attack on the congressional Act and the regulation made pursuant thereto.”161 Because the law at issue in Simkins
was exactly like one that had already been held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, Simkins presents a narrower standard for non-defense,
i.e., “there must be existing Supreme Court precedent on the constitutional issue before a President may decline to defend legislation.”162
Since 1977, every administration has declined to defend some
statutes based on its constitutional objections.163 Four cases illustrate
this phenomenon:164 Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. F.C.C.,165
League of Women Voters of California v. F.C.C.,166 Gavett v. Alexander,167
and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C..168 In Turner Broadcasting Systems,
President Bush ordered the DOJ not to defend Sections 4 and 5 (the
“must-carry” provisions) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992 because Bush believed the sections violated the First Amendment.169 President Bush had vetoed the Act, but
it was passed over his objections.170 Throughout litigation challenging
the must-carry provisions, the DOJ appeared on behalf of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and declined to defend the provisions, citing President Bush’s veto message.171 However, during the
case’s pendency, President Clinton assumed office and instructed the
DOJ to reverse course and defend the provisions.172

Gussis, supra note 143, at 608.
Id.
160
See id. (“The Supreme Court previously had ‘settled beyond question’ that the validity of
state-supported racial discrimination was ‘foreclosed as a litigable issue.’”).
161
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 962 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938
(1964).
162
Gussis, supra note 143, at 608.
163
See Fois Letter, supra note 147, at 7 (“In addition, it is worth noting several other cases in which
the Department of Justice argued against the constitutionality of a statute in court . . . .”); id. at 7 n.12
(citing cases); see also Ball, supra note 4, at 77 n.1 (“Every recent administration has refused to defend
some laws that it believed were unconstitutional.”).
164
These cases are the same ones highlighted by Assistant Attorney General Andrew Fois in his letter
to Chairman Hatch. Fois Letter, supra note 147.
165
819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated by 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
166
489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
167
477 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1979).
168
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
169
Fois Letter, supra note 147, at 6.
170
Id.
171
Id.; see also id. at 6 n.10 (citing court filings detailing the decision).
172
Fois Letter, supra note 147, at 6.
158
159
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In League of Women Voters, the Attorney General concluded the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which “prohibited noncommercial
television licensees from editorializing or endorsing or opposing candidates for public office,”173 was unconstitutional. The Attorney General
believed that the law “violated the First Amendment and that reasonable arguments could not be advanced to defend the statute against
constitutional challenge.”174 The FCC, through the DOJ, informed the
court that it would not defend the statute, so the Senate Legal Counsel
appeared as amicus curiae on the Senate’s behalf.175 While the district
court’s decision in the case was on appeal, the new Attorney General
(William F. Smith) reversed the Department’s decision and decided to
defend the statute.176 When the case finally reached the Supreme Court,
the Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment.177
In Gavett, the DOJ concluded that a program in which the Army
could sell surplus rifles only to members of the National Rifle
Association (NRA) violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantee because it could not satisfy even rational basis.178 Once the
DOJ informed the court of its intention not to defend, the court provided
Congress with an opportunity to defend the law, which it declined to
do; the NRA eventually defended the measure itself.179 The court ultimately applied strict scrutiny and declared the law unconstitutional.180
Finally, in Metro Broadcasting the Acting Solicitor General appeared
before the Court as amicus curiae to argue against the constitutionality of a statute that forbade the FCC to expend funds to evaluate its
“longstanding policy of awarding preferences in licensing to broadcast
stations with a certain level of minority ownership or participation.”181
The Acting Solicitor General concluded that the statute violated equal
protection, and the Senate Legal Counsel appeared as amicus curiae
on the Senate’s behalf to defend the statute’s constitutionality.182
Ultimately, the Court declared the statute to be constitutional.183

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 168.
Fois Letter, supra note 147, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
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2. OLC Opinions

Little has come out of OLC directly related to executive nondefense.184 Even in the most recent letter from Attorney General Holder
to Speaker John Boehner regarding the administration’s decision not to
defend DOMA, the DOJ document cited in support of non-defense is
the Fois Letter.185 The Fois Letter was drafted for Senator Orrin Hatch in
response to Hatch’s “inquiries regarding the President’s directive that
the Department of Justice decline to defend section 567 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. . . .”186 Fois admits in the
letter that the DOJ gave oral advice to President Clinton, while memorializing none of it.187 Quite simply, the Fois Letter makes clear that
the decision not to defend is a rule in search of a standard.188 Holder’s
letter to Boehner, which relies almost entirely on the Fois Letter, only
strengthens this conclusion.
3. Scholarship
Most scholarly articles in this area deal exclusively with nonenforcement, so the available literature is scant.189 An often-cited 1983
law review article entitled Executive Discretion and the Congressional
Defense of Statutes190 describes the standard for non-defense as one
where only “clearly unconstitutional” laws will go undefended by the
executive.191 However, the article’s reason for selecting this standard
is almost certainly because Attorney General Smith, in the League of
Women Voters case discussed above, reversed the position of Attorney
General Civiletti and, in doing so, stated that “the Department of Justice
has the responsibility to defend acts of Congress unless they intrude on
executive powers or are clearly unconstitutional . . . .”192
Over a decade later, another student note on the subject of nondefense addressed the doctrine in the context of President Clinton’s
decision not to defend the HIV provision of the 1996 National Defense
Authorization Act.193 According to this note, President Clinton’s “determination not to defend the HIV provision marks the executive branch’s
See id. at 7 (“There exist no formal guidelines that the Attorney General, the Solicitor General
and other Department officials consult in making such decisions.”).
185
See Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 5.
186
Fois Letter, supra note 147, at 1.
187
Id.
188
See id. at 7 (admitting that there are no formal guidelines promulgated by the Department).
189
Ball, supra note 4, at 77 n.7.
190
See supra note 3.
191
See id. at 979 (“Discretion to refuse to defend statutes is subject to abuse because it is difficult
to define objectively what constitutes a ‘clearly unconstitutional’ statute.”).
192
See id. at 973 n.7 (discussing recognized exceptions to the executive obligation to defend statutes);
accord Attorney General William French Smith, Press Release 5 (May 6, 1982).
193
See Gussis, supra note 143, at 591.
184
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first explicit assertion that such a decision faces a different, lower
threshold than a decision not to enforce legislation.”194 The standard
for non-defense employed by the Clinton administration is one where
the executive branch may decline to defend a statute in
situations where it determines that the statute is “probably” unconstitutional. There need not be an existing
court decision on the constitutional issue or arguments
supporting only one side of the dispute. Under these
circumstances, what legislation will be deemed “probably” unconstitutional becomes a question of leadership:
the executive branch must conduct its own constitutional evaluation and determine which position is most
“respectable.”195
Underlying this lower standard for non-defense is that “[s]uch evaluations appropriately reflect a President’s policy or political agenda.”196
For example, President Clinton’s position that the statute in question
was unconstitutional considered judicial precedent, the “policy goal of
supporting HIV-positive troops as valuable members of the military[,]
and a political agenda of catering to widespread public opposition to
the ban.”197 Gussis agrees with this lower threshold for non-defense
and considers it “appropriate as a matter of law and policy.”198
Former Solicitors General have also weighed in on the debate. In
2001, Seth Waxman wrote that “[v]igorously defending congressional
legislation serves the institutional interests and constitutional judgments of all three branches. . . .[by] ensur[ing] that proper respect is
given to Congress’s policy choices. . . [and by] preserv[ing] for the
courts their historic function of judicial review.”199 However, he went
on to quote Solicitor General Bork, who spoke of the “betrayal of profound obligations to the Court and to Constitutional processes to take
the simplistic position that whatever Congress enacts we will defend
. . . .”200 Moreover, Drew Days has noted that “[b]ecause both house
of Congress now have the formal capacity to represent themselves in
court, one could argue that the need for Solicitors General to presume
the constitutionality of, and defend in court, the acts of Congress is less
than it once was.”201
Id. at 604.
Id. at 623-24.
196
Id. at 624.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 638.
199
Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1078 (2001).
200
Id. at 1083 (citing Letter from Robert H. Bork, Solicitor Gen., to Simon Lazarus III (Aug. 5, 1975)).
201
Drew S. Days, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Characters, 83 Ky. L.J.
485, 502 (1994-1995).
194
195
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II. DOMA and the Recent Decision Not To Defend

In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).202 The purpose of DOMA was “to
create federal protection against the growing threat that legalization
of same-sex marriage in one state would open the door for judges and
other government officers to interpret federal law . . . as forcing other
states and the federal government to recognize same-sex marriage.”203
There are two operative sections in DOMA.
Section Two provides, in pertinent part, no state “shall
be required to give effect to” same-sex marriage from
any other state. Section Three provides, in relevant part,
for purposes of federal law, “the word ‘marriage’ means
only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife.”204
For purposes of this paper, only Section 3 will be explored.205
In 2004, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing to evaluate DOMA in the wake of mounting political pressure.206
Republican members of the subcommittee boasted that “[m]any experts
believe that the Defense of Marriage Act should and will survive constitutional scrutiny.”207 Most importantly, during the hearing, it was
brought to the attention of members that “respected individuals” concluded that DOMA “could and will” be declared unconstitutional either
under Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Romer v. Evans or the Court’s
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.208 The hearing’s purpose was to explore the
constitutionality of DOMA, and Chairman Chabot began his statement
by “acknowledg[ing] that this has become a high profile and politically
charged policy debate.”209 Congress took no action to repeal DOMA, nor
did the DOJ cease defending it in federal courts nationwide.210
However, on February 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder informed
Speaker Boehner of the President’s and his decision to cease defense
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2006)).
203
Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the
Constitution, 58 Drake L. Rev. 951, 959 (2010) (citing Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 28-32 (1996) (statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor,
Brigham Young University)).
204
Id. at 952 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 7).
205
See generally id. at 956-58 (providing background information on the numerous functions of Section
Three).
206
Defense of Marriage Act, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 2004 DOMA Hearing].
207
Id. at 1 (statement of Chairman Chabot).
208
Id. at 2.
209
Id.
210
Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 1.
202
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of DOMA in two pending cases211 in the Second Circuit.212 Unlike in
the other federal circuits213 that have addressed the appropriate level
of scrutiny that applies to classifications based on sexual orientation,
the issue is a matter of first impression in the Second Circuit.214 Instead
of arguing for rational basis review, “the President and [Holder] have
concluded that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant
heightened scrutiny and that, as applied to same-sex couples legally
married under state law, Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.”215
Notwithstanding the “substantial circuit court authority applying
rational basis,”216 Holder argues that the arguments or precedents upon
which those circuits relied are outdated.217 In short, the law is old and
the “scientific” arguments used to justify rational basis no longer hold
up against modern science.218
The reactions in the legal community to the Obama administration’s decision not to defend DOMA were swift and divided.219 On the
political front, rhetoric from both sides of the aisle filled the halls of
Congress, with some praising the decision and others, like Republican
Congressman Lamar Smith (House Judiciary Committee Chairman),
calling the decision not to defend DOMA “irresponsible,” “a transparent attempt to shirk the Department’s duty to defend the laws passed
See Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y.); see also Pedersen v. OPM, No. 3:10cv-1750 (D. Conn.). As of the date of submission of this paper, December 9, 2011, both cases are still
at the district court level, and no decision on the merits has been reached in either.
212
Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 1.
213
See id. at 3 (“To be sure, there is substantial circuit court authority applying rational basis review
to sexual-orientation classifications.”).
214
See id. at 2.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 3.
217
Id. (“Many of them reason only that if consensual same-sex sodomy may be criminalized under
Bowers v. Hardwick, then it follows that no heightened review is appropriate—a line of reasoning that
does not survive the overruling of Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 538 U.S. 558 (2003).”).
218
Id.
219
See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Executive Power Grab in the Decision Not to Defend DOMA, Volokh
Conspiracy, (Feb. 23, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/02/23/the-executive-power-grabin-the-decision-not-to-defend-doma/ (noting that “the Obama Administration has moved the
goalposts of the usual role of the Executive branch in defending statutes”); Megan McArdle, The
Imperial Presidency, The Atlantic, Feb. 23, 2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2011/02/the-imperial-presidency/71632/ (“I think it would be disastrous on a whole lot of
levels if the GOP managed to undo ObamaCare with this sort of thing. But if the precedent stands,
I think you can expect them to try it the next time they have the presidency.”); Valerie Richardson,
House GOP Eyes DOMA Defense Legal Void Left by Obama’s Move, Wash. Times, Feb. 24, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/24/house-gop-eyes-doma-defense/?page=all (“At the
same time, the administration may have done opponents of same-sex marriage a favor by allowing
the House to substitute lawyers who have no conflict about defending the law. Conservatives have
complained about the Justice Department’s less-than-zealous legal defense.”); Tico Almeida, President
Obama Strengthens ENDA by Rejecting DOMA, The Bilerico Project, (Feb. 26, 2011, 12:00PM), http://
www.bilerico.com/2011/02/ president_obama_strengthens_enda_by_rejecting_doma.php (“For
starters, the Obama Administration deserves credit for refusing to defend the constitutionality of the
clearly discriminatory Section 3 of DOMA.”).
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by Congress,” and “disappointing.”220 And then there were admonishments, such as one blogger that asked “liberals”: “If you think declining to defend DOMA is the right decision, how will you feel when a
Republican administration declines to defend in a school prayer case?
Or an abortion case? Or on Obamacare itself?”221 For months after the
decision was made, there were numerous blog posts, letters to the editor, and articles addressing the propriety of the decision.222
The House Subcommittee on the Constitution—still under
Republican leadership—held a hearing in mid-April of 2011 to address
the administration’s decision. 223 Chairman Trent Franks began the
hearing with this statement:
Now, it is true that past Presidents have declined to
defend certain statutes that they in good faith determined were unconstitutional, but never has a President
refused to defend a law of such public importance on a
legal theory so far beyond any court precedent—and so
clearly and transparently for political reasons.224
In reply, Congressman Jerrold “Jerry” Nadler (Ranking Member of
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee)
eloquently and thoroughly chastised his Republican colleagues for
spending valuable time and resources continuing to defend a law
that is so patently irrational and discriminatory, and which “[t]he
Congressional Record makes perfectly clear . . . is intended to express
moral disapproval of gay men, lesbians, and their families.”225

DOJ Has a Responsibility to Defend DOMA, Press Release (Feb. 23, 2011), http://judiciary.house.
gov/ news/2011/feb/110223DOMA.html (statement of Chairman Smith).
221
Jason Kuznicki, The Non-Defense of DOMA, Cato @ Liberty, (Feb. 24, 2011, 12:43PM), http://www.
cato-at-liberty.org/the-non-defense-of-doma/.
222
See generally Hans von Spakovsky, The DOJ’s Unprofessionalism in Its Attack on Traditional Marriage,
The Foundry, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/07/07/the-doj%E2%80%99s-unprofessionalism-in-itsattack-on-traditional-marriage/ (July 7, 2011, 11:43AM) (“The Justice Department should not be
sandbagging duly enacted federal laws in court because it disagrees with the policy.”); see also David
Ingram, Potential Cost of Defending DOMA Goes Up, Nat’l L.J., Oct. 4, 2011, available at http://www.law.
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202517823705 (noting the price of hiring a former U.S. Solicitor
General to defend DOMA could reach 1.5 million).
223
Defending Marriage, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm.on the Judiciary,
112th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 15, 2011) at 1 [hereinafter 2011 DOMA Hearing] (statement of Chairman
Franks) (“The reason that we are here is that the Obama administration recently announced that it
would no longer defend marriage.”).
224
Id. at 2.
225
Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Nadler, Ranking Member).
220
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Since the decision not to defend,226 two scholars have already published law review articles evaluating the decision.227 Professor Carlos
A. Ball agrees with the Obama administration’s decision not to defend
DOMA and proposes four factors that should guide future Presidents
in analyzing the propriety of non-defense: “whether (1) there are binding judicial precedents on the relevant constitutional issues; (2) those
issues raise significant normative and policy questions; (3) Congress
considered the constitutional issues during the enactment process;
and (4) it is likely that the President’s decision will preclude judicial
review.”228 Professor Robert J. Delahunty approves of the decision
but thinks that the administration did not go far enough and that it
should have declined to enforce Section 3.229 In arriving at this conclusion, Delahunty adopts Professor Prakash’s view of non-enforcement
of unconstitutional laws being a duty—not a discretionary task.230
This author favors the views of Professor Ball over those of Professor
Delahunty, as will be discussed in Part III.
III. The Decision To Continue To Enforce DOMA Was Proper
President Obama’s decision to continue to enforce DOMA while
declining to defend it in the Second Circuit was proper. I arrive at this
conclusion using a two-step analysis: (1) was the decision to continue
to enforce proper? If it was proper, (2) was the President still justified
in declining to defend the law before the Second Circuit?
A. The Civiletti-Dellinger Test for Non-Enforcement
The two-prong test established in the Civiletti Memorandum most
closely comports with the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in
Since this article was written, but prior to publication, Attorney General Holder announced that
the Department of Justice would not defend 38 U.S.C. § 101(3) and (31). See Letter to Speaker, supra
note 144. Both of these sections deal with the definition of “spouse” in the context of military veterans’
benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3), (31) (defining “spouse” as “a person of the opposite sex”). Id.
Significantly, this is the first time that the administration has declined to defend the definition
of “spouse” within the military context. Using the same rationale as the administration’s prior
decision not to defend Section 3 of DOMA, Attorney General Holder informed Speaker Boehner
that the definition’s exclusion of same-sex individuals fails the “heightened scrutiny” standard of
constitutional review. See Letter to Speaker Boehner (Feb. 17, 2012). The case is McLaughlin v. Panetta.
11-11905 (D. Mass.). The district court has stayed the case for 60 days to give Congress time to defend
those provisions. Thus, the next deadline for filing a responsive pleading and response to plaintiffs’
motion for SJ is April 28th.
227
Ball, supra note 4; Robert J. Delahunty, The Obama Administration’s Decisions to Enforce, but Not
Defend, DOMA § 3, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 69 (2011).
228
Ball, supra note 4, at 79.
229
See Delahunty, supra note 227, at 75 (“Given the strength of the Administration’s constitutional
convictions concerning § 3, it is inexcusable for the Administration to continue to enforce it.”).
230
See id. at 71 (“I believe that Prakash is correct. In addition to Prakash’s powerful textual and
structural reasons, sound policy supports his claims.”).
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the Constitution.231 Under Civiletti’s view, the President is authorized
not to enforce an Act of Congress only if the statute is (1) transparently
invalid232 or (2) infringes on presidential power.233 If the statute falls
in the second category, then the next step should be to continue to the
three-prong test established in the Dellinger Memorandum,234 which
derives from the seven considerations mentioned by Dellinger.235 If,
however, the statute falls in the first category and is “transparently
invalid,” then the analysis should be simply whether the law is substantially similar to a law that the Supreme Court has previously held
to be unconstitutional. 236 If the statute in question fits in neither category, then the President must continue to enforce the law until it is
declared unconstitutional by a federal court.
Adding Dellinger’s multi-factor test as an additional analytical step
to the decision not to enforce statutes implicating presidential power
hopefully will assuage the fears of those like Professor Johnsen who
oppose the broad construction of executive non-enforcement represented by the Flanigan Memorandum, while appeasing scholars like
Professor May who are concerned with presidential abuse of power.237
See 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21, at 56 (“[I]f executive officers were to adopt a policy
of ignoring or attacking Acts of Congress whenever they believed them to be in conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution, their conduct in office could jeopardize the equilibrium established
within our constitutional system.”).
232
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 23. For the first prong of this test, see 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra
note 21, at 63 n.1, (“[i]f an Act of Congress directs or authorizes the Executive to take action which
is ‘transparently invalid’ when viewed in light of established constitutional law, I believe it is the
Executive’s constitutional duty to decline to execute that power.” ).
233
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 23. For the second prong of this test, see 1980 Civiletti Memorandum,
supra note 21, at 56, (“[I]f that equilibrium [of the balance of separation of powers] has already been
placed in jeopardy by the Act of Congress itself, the case is much more likely to fall within that
narrow class.”).
234
See 1994 Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 6, at 201 (Allowing for the possibility for the President
to refuse to enforce a law that infringes on his power ensures that the President is not powerless
against those “legislative encroachments on executive authority [that] . . . will not be justiciable or are
for other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court . . . .”)
235
See supra Part I.A.2.:
(1) The President has an independent duty to protect and defend the Constitution, which includes
the duty promptly to communicate his constitutional objections to a statute to Congress; and while
he should presume the constitutionality of laws passed by Congress, he must still exercise his
independent judgment in determining (a) if a statute is unconstitutional and (b) whether it is probable
that the Court would agree with him. (2) If he answers (1)(a) and (1)(b) in the affirmative, then he
must next balance the effect of compliance on the rights of individuals and on his own presidential
authority, giving special weight to whether the law purports to limit the President’s Article II powers
(especially his Commander in Chief powers). Finally, (3) the fact that the President signed the very
law he then declines to enforce does not change the analysis.
236
Cf. 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21, at 59 (“I think that in rare cases the Executive’s duty
to the constitutional system may require that a statute be challenged; and if that happens, executive
action in defiance of the statute is authorized and lawful if the statute is unconstitutional.”).
237
See id. at 56 ( “[T]he Executive can rarely defy an Act of Congress without upsetting the
equilibrium established within our constitutional system, [but]if that equilibrium has already been
placed in jeopardy by the Act of Congress itself, the case is much more likely to fall within that
narrow class.”).
231
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Moreover, allowing the President to decline to enforce “transparently
invalid” laws using a different, albeit equally demanding, standard
leaves the President able to thwart congressional attempts at ignoring
or circumventing Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, in the case of
a statute that falls in either category, Professor Prakash’s understanding of the Take Care Clause as mandating that a President not enforce
certain laws would provide useful guidance by illustrating why the
President must decline to enforce a statute at all. Finally, this test represents more of a middle-of-the-road approach because it allows for
non-enforcement in more circumstances than would Professor May,238
but in fewer circumstances than would Professor Prakash.239 This standard, a hybrid of the approach of Civiletti and Dellinger, will be called
the Civiletti-Dellinger test.
B. Applying the Civiletti-Dellinger Test to DOMA
The application of the Civiletti-Dellinger test to the decision to
continue to enforce DOMA is straightforward. First, DOMA is not
“transparently invalid,” for the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
its constitutionality. Second, DOMA does not implicate presidential power. Therefore, because DOMA fits in neither category of the
Civiletti-Dellinger test, the President must continue to enforce it until a
federal court declares it unconstitutional.
C. The “Probably Unconstitutional”
Multi-Factor Test for Non-Defense
Defending a law so long as a “reasonable argument” can be made for
its constitutionality is a nebulous and unhelpful standard. Reasonable
minds often will differ when it comes to what is a “reasonable” argument; some will even go so far as to play semantics by differentiating
a “reasonable” argument from a merely “plausible” one.240 Replacing
this standard with one more focused on the constitutionality of the law
itself helps place the debate back where it belongs—grounded in the
Constitution. According to Gussis, the “probably unconstitutional”
standard was first used by the Clinton Administration in its decision
not to defend the HIV provision of the 1996 defense authorization bill.241
I propose essentially the same test, but with the addition of four factors
that should be balanced in the analysis in order to decide whether the
law, in fact, is more likely than not unconstitutional.
See May, supra note 15, at 988 (listing four factors that must be satisfied before a President may
refuse to enforce a statute).
239
See Prakash, supra note 4, at 1679-80 (arguing that Presidents should not enforce congressional
statutes whenever they are “confident” that the statute is unconstitutional).
240
Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 5.
241
Gussis, supra note 143, at 608.
238
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“Probably unconstitutional” is best understood in terms of the
standard for the burden of proof in civil trial, i.e., a preponderance
of the evidence. Therefore, if the President determines that it is more
than fifty-percent likely that a law violates the Constitution, then he
may refuse to defend, or cease defending, the law. In arriving at his
answer, however, the President should consider the following factors:
(1) Has new Supreme Court precedent likely changed the applicable
constitutional analysis as applied to the law? (2) Has a lower federal
court recently either called the law into question or directly addressed
its constitutionality? (3) Does the President, relying on his own constitutional judgment and on the opinion of the DOJ, conclude that the
law is unconstitutional? (4) Does the passage of the law pre-date the
President’s term in office such that he did not have an opportunity to
veto it? At a minimum, two of the four questions should be answered in
the affirmative in order for the President to confidently assert that the
law is “probably unconstitutional”; however, an affirmative answer to
either Question (1) or Question (2), without more, may suffice.
D. Applying the “Probably Unconstitutional”
Multi-Factor Test to DOMA
Applying this standard to DOMA, the President would have arrived
at the same conclusion as with application of the “no reasonable argument” standard. To begin with, all four questions of the multi-factor test
can be answered in the affirmative. First, as Attorney General Holder’s
letter makes clear, Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans likely changed
the constitutional analysis regarding laws discriminating against samesex individuals.242 Second, two federal district court cases recently have
declared Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.243 Third, the President
and the Attorney General each have concluded that Section 3 of DOMA
is unconstitutional.244 Finally, the President did not have an opportunity to voice his constitutional concerns during the passage of the law,
thereby precluding him from taking advantage of the President’s most
powerful tool of constitutional judgment—the veto.245 Thus, applying
the “probably unconstitutional” multi-factor test, the decision not to
defend Section 3 of DOMA was proper.
Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 3.
See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 387 (D. Mass. 2010) (“DOMA fails to pass
constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational basis test.”); Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding DOMA violates
Spending Clause and Tenth Amendment).
244
Letter to Speaker, supra note 144, at 5 (“The President has also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA .
. . is therefore unconstitutional.”).
245
See 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 21, at 58 (“The Framers gave the President a veto for
the purpose, among others, of enabling him to defend his constitutional position.”).
242
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Conclusion
Recently, the Obama administration’s decision to continue to
enforce, but not defend, Section 3 of DOMA has sparked controversy in
the legal academy and in the Halls of Congress. Such a decision, while
not unusual, certainly does not occur every day. The Obama administration’s recent decision has reignited the debate on the propriety of
executive non-enforcement and non-defense.
This paper has briefly surveyed most of the relevant case law, OLC
opinions, and scholarship addressing the sister doctrines of executive
non-enforcement and executive non-defense. Although much has been
written about non-enforcement, substantially less attention has been
paid to non-defense. A combination of case law, OLC opinions, and
scholarship suggests that multiple standards of non-enforcement currently exist, but none seems to best address the criticisms often levied
at supporters of non-enforcement. Furthermore, what has been written
about non-defense does not provide a clear standard. I propose a new
standard for each: the “Civiletti-Dellinger” test for non-enforcement
and the “Probably Unconstitutional” test for non-defense. When each
standard is applied to the DOMA decision, I conclude that Obama
properly continued to enforce Section 3 of DOMA while simultaneously declining to defend it in the courts.
This paper has offered only an introduction to an historically complicated, politically charged, and standardless area of constitutional
law that would be well served by some doctrinal clarity and fresh
perspectives. I am certain that more will be written on this topic in the
coming months, and I look forward to seeing if my take on the issue is
shared, at least in part, by anyone else.

